Stephen Curry’s Three-point Barrage

From Mark Price to Ray Allen, Dennis Scott to Mookie Blaylock, and Reggie Miller to Peja Stojakovic, the NBA has seen its share of great three-point shooters. Of course, there are those that shoot obscene percentages, but could never do so if they were a focal part of the offense. Then there are those that huck it up a lot, but aren’t the most efficient. To be truly great at three point shooting, I’m looking for the combination of volume and efficiency.

Here are the ten best seasons in terms of total threes made:

Rank	Player	3PT	Season	3P%	Multiplied
1	Ray Allen	269	2005-06	0.4119	110.8
2	Dennis Scott	267	1995-96	0.4252	113.5
3	George McCloud	257	1995-96	0.3791	97.4
4	Jason Richardson	243	2007-08	0.4057	98.6
5	Peja Stojakovic	240	2003-04	0.4332	104.0
6	Stephen Curry	236	2012-13	0.4547	107.3
7	Mookie Blaylock	231	1995-96	0.3708	85.7
	Peja Stojakovic	231	2007-08	0.4408	101.8
9	Ray Allen	229	2001-02	0.4337	99.3
	Reggie Miller	229	1996-97	0.4272	97.8

Stephen Curry currently sits at 236 triples this season, just 33 shy of Ray Allen’s single-season record of 269 set back in 2006. Perhaps more impressive, Curry has made them 45.5% of the time, and that’s best on the list. The three-point makes record will be tough for Curry. With eight games to play, he would have make more than four threes per game to break the record, a tall order for a man that has made 3.37 per game this year and just 2.64 per 38 minutes on his career.* But regardless, he will arguably become the most efficient three-point volume shooter for any season ever.

Now, let’s get back to breaking Ray Allen’s record.

Assessing the probability distribution of Curry’s three pointers is tricky. I would be inclined to go with a Poisson distribution, but it doesn’t fit all that well as you can see in the picture (blue curve). Even if I remove his 11-three outlier performance, it it still a bad fit (yellow curve).** It’s probably most appropriate to use a compound distribution like a good Bayesian would, but I have little time for such things. We’ll go ahead and evoke the Central Limit Theorem for eight games, if you guys don’t mind.

If we assume that his standardized distribution over the next eight games will follow a T-distribution, then the probability of Curry making at least 33 triples is about 17.8%.

Good luck, little Warrior.

*Curry is currently averaging 38.2 minutes per game this season.

**The astute basketball fan will notice my use of Warriors colors. 

Ducks Loss Diagnosis

First 10 Minutes	Oregon	Louisville		Last 30	Oregon	Louisville
ORebs	1	3		ORebs	10	6
FG Missed	9	7		FG Missed	25	17
OReb%	11.1%	42.9%		OReb%	40.0%	35.3%
FG Made	3	11		FG Made	24	17
FG%	25.0%	61.1%		FG%	49.0%	50.0%
TOs	4	3		TOs	8	10
Points	8	24		Points	61	53

 

Louisville scored more points than Oregon, and thus the official rules of college basketball declared the Cardinals the winners. However, a thorough analysis by yours truly suggests that the Ducks shat their collective pants during the first ten minutes of play, and that is why the Cardinals were eventually declared the winners.

Oregon did everything it needed to do to win the game…in the last thirty minutes. It out-rebounded Louisville, turned the ball over less often, and even shot a blistering 49% from the floor. I say “blistering” because the Cardinals had allowed opponents just a 39% clip before their matchup with the Fighting (why?) Ducks.

It was a good season and a valiant effort for the over-achieving Ducks. I guess it’s just hard to play over your head for a full 40 minutes.

Livin’ on more than a Prayer

When you look at the top-scoring teams in the country, it seems like you have to scroll down forever to get to Louisville; the Cardinals are tied at 41^st in the country with Santa Clara in points per game at 73.6.  You have to go even further down—all the way to 107^th—to find the Cardinals in field goal percentage at 44.5%. That’s just below Oregon’s 44.7%, and additionally, Louisville was 219^th in three-point percentage on the regular season. How, then, can Ken Pomeroy rank Louisville’s offense 10^th in Division I basketball?

There are a few good answers to that question. Though Louisville shoots a low percentage from the floor, there are other components to offensive efficiency. The Cardinals, for instance, are 9^th nationally in offensive rebounding percentage at 38%. That means that Louisville rebounds nearly two of every five of its own misses! It’s almost okay for them to shoot poorly.

Rebounding. Check. But the Cardinals are actually not so good with ball security, ranking 101^st in turnover percentage. Turnover percentage is a more relevant stat that TO per game because it controls for a team’s pace of play. Faster teams will naturally turn the ball over more times per game because they’ll get more chances to cough it up. Louisville is but average in this category.

So far, it’s hard to figure out how Pomeroy has them rated so highly. With an average turnover rate and below average shooting, even a great offensive rebounding percentage doesn’t seem like enough to rank them so highly. Enter strength of schedule. By looking at all the season stats from teams that Louisville has played, we can assess how good those defenses were. It turns out that Louisville played a bunch of teams that tended to stymie the opponents’ offenses. Louisville’s schedule featured the 12^th best group of defenses in college basketball.

Now we start to see why that Cardinals offense might be more potent that it looks on the surface. In its two Tournament games thus far, when given the chance to play against inferior competition, Louisville shot 56.9% from the floor, and 43.5% from three. If they’re open, the Cardinals can put it in the peach basket.

But having arguably the 10^th best offense overall doesn’t add up to a top seed all by itself. Louisville has one of the best defenses in the country, and here’s why. Good defense starts and ends by reducing the opponent’s efficiency, and Louisville does that well. Opponents shoot just 39% from the floor against the Cardinals, leading to those opponents scoring less than one point per scoring attempt (factoring in free throws, the most efficient shot in the game). Among the 16 teams left in the tourney—quite the selection of talented teams—Louisville is fifth in opponents’ points per scoring attempt. Not a fantastic shot blocking team, the Cardinals must be really good at forcing tougher shots. Oregon is not a great shooting team—though recently they have tried to convince us otherwise—and things could get ugly if the Ducks’ shot selection is not top notch.

Oh, and one more thing. Louisville forces turnovers at a ridiculously high 27.4% rate, good for second in the country.  More than a quarter of opponents’ possessions conclude with handing the ball right back to the Cardinals for free. This is another area where a Louisville strength lines up with an Oregon weakness. The Ducks turn the ball over like it’s a hot potato. Their 21.2% turnover rate ranks them 265^th in the country, and like with shooting, things could get ugly if Oregon is as careless as it has been the last two Tournament games.

So how do the Ducks win a game like this? Well, it would definitely help if Dotson went 5-6 from deep again, but counting on lights-out shooting performances from a team that has shot 126^th in the country overall is a bit optimistic. Oregon can win by doing other things, so long as it doesn’t shoot itself out of the game or give the ball away for free.

If Oregon wins, I’d bet this guy is your player of the game.

Louisville has some weaknesses. Despite an excellent offensive rebounding rate, Louisville is ranked 175^th in defensive rebounding. My old coach, who also happened to be my dad, once posed the following logic to me. A guy that grabs as many offensive boards as defensive boards could be a guy that just works his ass off on both ends, or he might not know how to box out leaving himself with equal chances of a rebound on either end. Louisville could very well be an athletic rebounding team, but not a technical rebounding team. Oregon, on the other hand, is ranked in the top 30 in both offensive and defensive rebounding. If Oregon really is more technically sound on the glass, then the Cardinals’ offensive rebounding advantage could be turned around on them.

Additionally, I mentioned that Louisville’s typical opponent was a better-than-average defensive team overall. Well, it turns out Oregon is also a better-than-average defensive team. Pomeroy estimated that Louisville’s opponents gave up 96 points per 100 possessions on average. Oregon gives up just 87 points per 100 possessions according to Pomeroy’s formula, which adjusts for competition. That’s 9^th in the country! Louisville should not such an easy time scoring as it did against North Carolina A&T or Colorado State, and when they miss, the Cardinals should not have such an easy a time getting a second chance.

Here is how Louisville did against Pomeroy’s top 30 defenses.

Opponent	Def Rank	PF	PA	Wins	Losses
Duke	23	71	76	0	1
@Memphis	26	87	78	1	0
Syracuse	10	68	70	0	1
@Villanova	29	64	73	0	1
@Georgetown	4	51	53	0	1
Pitt	16	64	61	1	0
@Syracuse	10	58	53	1	0
Cincy	14	67	51	1	0
Villanova*	29	74	55	1	0
Syracuse*	10	78	61	1	0
Oregon	9	???	???	???	???
Totals and Avgs.	16.4	68.2	63.1	6	4

This is definitely an impressive chart for Louisville. A +5.1 point differential against what amounts to all Tournament teams is nothing to scoff at. But among these matchups, Louisville did struggle with the likes of Villanova, losing in their first matchup of the season, and it struggled in a three-point victory over Pitt. Oh, and it lost four games. Impressive doesn’t mean perfect.

One last thing to look at, as I promised I would in my article yesterday, is luck, or better put, “Luck.” Pomeroy’s luck statistic basically compares a team’s win-loss record to its average point differential. Teams that outperform their average point differential in the win column are said to be “lucky.” I don’t think Pomeroy actually believes all of the discrepancy is due to luck, and nor should we. There are things teams can do to win close games, where the point differential is only a few points. Oregon performed well in close games this season, as evidenced by its +6.3% luck rating. Louisville, on the other hand, performed a little below average at -3.3%. Oregon definitely got some favorable outcomes, as the Washington game in the Pac-12 tourney comes to mind, but it probably does something to help itself in the clutch, too, and I think it has something to do with execution.

In five of the last six seasons, Dana Altman’s teams have finished better than their point differentials would suggest, implying an ability to win close games that goes beyond lucky timing. It could very well be that the man at the helm for the Ducks has his players thinking situationally, and has them just as prepared to execute in the clutch as any other time in the game.

It will be an uphill battle to beat the top-seeded team in the country, but Oregon has the defensive firepower to give the Cardinals fits and keep the game close. And the Ducks just might have an advantage in a close game.

Ducks History, Luck, and … Maarty Leunen!

The 2006-2007 basketball season was a fun one for Ducks fans. Oregon made it to the Elite Eight, and finished the season 29-8, losing by eight points to the eventual champion, the Florida Gators. If you don’t recall, during the previous year the Ducks went an uninspiring 15-18 (7-11), finishing seventh in the Pac-10, and leaving little encouragement for the 2006-2007 season. At least one outlet picked the Ducks to finish fifth in the Pac-10 that year and miss out on the NCAA Tournament completely. But one Ken Pomeroy, college basketball stats dude extraordinaire, had some other things to say about the Ducks. Or, at least, his stats did. I came across this little nugget about the 2005-2007 Oregon Ducks basketball teams in August of 2006:

Another disappointing season for Malik Hairston, Aaron Brooks, and Co., right? But the season wasn’t necessarily as bad as it looked. Not when you consider that the Ducks led the nation in losses by luck. Had the breaks merely evened out for Oregon, they would have been 20-13 and perhaps an at-large team instead of postseason-less. Oregon was involved in nine games decided by 3 or less, and was victorious just once. And that doesn’t include the season-ending double-OT loss to Cal.

Don’t be surprised if Oregon’s record improves dramatically in the finale for Brooks (and the junior Hairston?), even if their play doesn’t. And if their performance improves as much as it did between ‘05 and ‘06, we’ll be talking about a team that wins 12 or 13 Pac-10 games and gets a high seed in the NCAA Tournament, despite a pathetic non-conference schedule. You heard it here first: 2007 is the year of Chamberlain Oguchi (or Maarty Leunen – I haven’t decided).

It turns out that not only did Oregon’s “luck” even out, but it added Tajuan Porter and the existing pieces did get a little better. The Ducks didn’t quite get to twelve pac-10 wins, finishing 11-7—and it was definitely more the year of Leunen than Oguchi—but it’s hard to ignore the luck factor.

Teams that shoot free throws well or have smart guards that can control the ball against a late, frantic press definitely have the ability to win close games and outperform their point differentials. But there is a powerful force known as regression to the mean that is also at work, and ignoring it in a future projection would be foolish. Pomeroy was essentially saying, “Hey look, guys. Oregon performed terribly in close games, but it’s so hard to be that bad that the Ducks have to get better in those situations.” And they did. The Ducks went 6-4 in OT games and games decided by three points or less during the 2006-2007 season.

In my Oregon-Louisville preview coming up before the big game, we’ll definitely talk some more about this “luck” thing.

Oregon–St. Louis Recap

As I mentioned in the game preview, the Ducks were the stronger rebounding team during the season, but the lesser team when it came to ball security.

True to form, the Ducks out-rebounded the Billikens any way you look at it. Oregon grabbed nine offensive rebounds to St. Louis’ three, and 28 defensive rebounds to just 20 for the Billikens. That’s especially impressive on the offensive end where, due to hot shooting, the Ducks had eight less misses to rebound.

Also true to form, the Ducks lost the turnover battle 18 – 12, though E.J. Singler had eight of them on his own. That didn’t matter this game, as Oregon eclipsed the six possessions it lost on turnovers with that six-rebound advantage on the offensive glass and that 52.8% field goal percentage, leading to a sizzling 1.21 points per shot.

The three-point barrage is not something that is true to form for the Ducks. During the season, Oregon was a terrible three-point shooting team, ranking worse than 200th in the country in three-point percentage. However, in the last five games—during the Pac-12 and NCAA Tournaments—Oregon has shot 34-74 from deep for a 46% average. I’m not sure this is something that will last, as it’s hard to ignore the first 30 games of the season.

If Oregon had shot something like  5-11 (45%) that game instead of 8-11 (72%) from three, and if the Billikens had shot even 7-21 (33%) instead of 3-21 (14%), it would have been a different game. That’s a 21-point swing. Oregon can continue to count on hot shooting, or it can give itself more possessions to get shots up by reducing the boneheaded turnovers. And hey, maybe if the Ducks can do both, they can even beat Louisville. But they shouldn’t count on such a three-point shooting discrepancy again.

Oregon (12) — Louisville (1) matchup preview to come!

What is a Billiken?

Wikipedia did some scouting on the Ducks’ opponent today, the St. Louis University Billikens:

The Billiken was a charm doll created by an American art teacher and illustrator, Florence Pretz of St. Louis, Missouri, who is said to have seen the mysterious figure in a dream. In 1908, she obtained a design patent on the ornamental design of the Billiken, who was elf-like with pointed ears, a mischievous smile and a tuft of hair on his pointed head. His arms were short and he was generally sitting with his legs stretched out in front of him. To buy a Billiken was said to give the purchaser luck, but to have one given would be better luck.

So, perhaps St. Louis has luck on its side, but didn’t get a lot else out of that scouting report. I read further:

Today, the Billiken is the official mascot of Saint Louis University and St. Louis University High School, both Jesuit institutions, and both located in St. Louis. The Billiken is also the official mascot of the Royal Order of Jesters, an invitation only Shriner group, affiliated with Freemasonry.

It turns out that “[t]he denomination with the longest history of objection to Freemasonry is the Roman Catholic Church,” and now I’m just confused. So, while Wikiepedia was quite helpful, I’m not about to put all my eggs into one scouting report. The seeding suggests that St. Louis is the better team, and Wikipedia suggests it might have more luck, but the Tournament has seen quite a few upsets, and Oregon has already directed and produced one of them. Let’s take a look at how Oregon might pull off a trip to the Sweet Sixteen.

Oregon is not a great scoring team. As usual, I’m not talking about totals, but rather, efficiency. The Ducks’ 44.5% field goal percentage ranks 104th in D-I hoops, and despite a recent barrage of long-range marksmanship, their 32.4% from three-point range doesn’t often save them (227th nationally…ouch!). Defense and rebounding—mostly rebounding—have gotten the Ducks to where they are today. Oregon’s best chances probably lie in the fact that one-game playoffs are a hotbed for statistical variance. Some kid can make eight triples in one game, and then go 2-for-12 the next (his name was Tajuan Porter). But two things that teams have a lot of control over from game-to-game are ball security and rebounding, and the Ducks happen to be good at one of those. Admire some statistics:

	Margin	Pace	TS%	OReb%	DReb%	TO%
Oregon	8.2	68.3	53.6%	34.9%	70.9%	21.6%
St. Louis	10.9	63.7	55.5%	28.1%	70.7%	17.8%

Kazemi blowing up his inflatable biceps.

Both teams have solid margins of victory, an all-around summary of a team’s success on the scoreboard, but Oregon carries a heavy offensive rebounding advantage. Because I calculated rebounding as a percentage of missed shots here, Oregon didn’t get some sort of hidden advantage for being a bad shooting team. They did, however, recruit the likes of Arsalan Kazemi and Tony Woods, two guys that grab a lot of rebounds. The Ducks earned two additional field goal attempts and four more free throw attempts per game than its opponents, thanks mostly to their offensive rebounding.

While Oregon gives itself more chances on the glass, it takes away chances from itself by turning the ball over more frequently than do the Billikens. With point guard Dominic Artis looking good and healthy, Oregon has a better chance to shave the turnover deficit while maintaining a rebounding advantage, and that could very well be the key to an upset.

Any one game can be decided by a hot shooter or a few bad calls, but if the Ducks are able to nab a high percentage of the available rebounds, and outperform their turnover rates from the regular season, then they’ll significantly improve those chances of an upset.

Oregon Shafted?

Joe Lunardi projected Oregon as a 9-seed at the end of the regular season, and then he upgraded the Ducks to a projected 8-seed after a win against UCLA in the Pac-12 tournament championship game. When I saw the 12-seed that Oregon was given Sunday afternoon, my reaction was probably similar to that of many Duck fans. I was mildly upset,  but then I was immediately reminded of an article I read some years ago by this guy you might know, Nate Silver.

Oregon was expected by many to get an 8-seed or a 9-seed, but as Silver explains, those are probably the worst seeds to be awarded in the 5-to-12 range. If we assume Oregon is as talented as most 8/9-seeds, then had they gotten an 8 or 9-seed, the Ducks would have had about a 50% chance of winning in round one and a 14% chance of winning in round two. That multiplies out to a 7% chance of making the Sweet 16, which is likely a high estimate given that Oregon’s true talent level is objectively worse than a typical 8-seed.*

From the 12-seed, the Ducks will need to beat a 5-seed in Oklahoma State, and then probably the 4-seed in St. Louis (though possibly the 13 in New Mexico State). History suggests that most 12-seeds have a 34% chance of a round one upset. Those that are able to pull off the upset go on to beat the 4-seed 40% of time. That seems a little backward that 12-seeds would do better against 4-seeds than 5-seeds, but remember there’s selection bias. The 12’s that get to play 4’s are the ones that were able to beat the 5’s first. So this is a group of 12-seeds that was underrated. If we just take those probabilities from past tournaments at face value, then Oregon would have a 14% chance of making the Sweet 16. That’s almost surely a low estimate, as Oregon’s true talent level is probably something better than a typical 12-seed.**

Oregon’s chances of making the Sweet 16 actually improved from a conservative estimate of 7% to 14%, simply by getting “shafted” by the seeding the committee, which had no idea it was actually doing Oregon a favor. Indeed, if you look back at the past six tournaments, you’ll find that five 12-seeds have made it to the Sweet 16 versus just one 8-seed and one 9-seed.

UPDATE: Silver’s projections are out, and he has given Oregon a 17.5% chance at the Sweet 16. The 8 and 9-seeds in that draw, Colorado State and Missouri, have been given a combined 14.5%.

 

*Ken Pomeroy has Oregon as a true-talent 10-seed while Jeff Sagarin has them as a true-talent 12-seed. The AP poll projected Oregon as a 9-seed before winning the Pac-12 tournament. So a simple average of the three would estimate the Ducks’ true talent level as about that of a typical 10-seed. 

**And actually, if we additionally account for the slim chances that New Mexico State pulls it out against St. Louis, Oregon could have something closer to a 20% chance at the Sweet 16. 

Wesley Matthews the Role Player

I have covered the Blazers’ starters this past week, from Lillard to Batum and Aldridge to Hickson, so check them out if you missed them. There’s just one left!

Wesley Matthews and his 14.9 points, 2.8 rebounds, and 2.8 assists per game don’t exactly jump off the page. In fact, even when you adjust for minutes played, they don’t become any more impressive (because Matthews plays a lot of minutes). A 15-point average in the NBA is nothing to scoff at, but it’s still just 13th best among shooting guards. It’s safe to say that Matthews isn’t what you’d call a volume anything. What Matthews is is consistent. During the past three seasons, all with Portland, Matthews’ has been almost machine-like. Check out some of his key stats below:

Season	3pt%	FT%	TS%	Usage	Rebs	Pts	PER
2010-11	0.407	0.844	0.582	15.3	3.4	17.0	15.5
2011-12	0.383	0.860	0.539	13.8	3.6	14.6	14.1
2012-13	0.403	0.784	0.578	14.5	2.9	15.5	14.5

Not a lot has changed from Matthews since he became a Trail Blazer, and the Player Efficiency Rating (PER) sums that up appropriately. Matthews’ role is that of a, well, role player, and the 15-ish Player Efficiency Rating (PER) over the past three seasons exhibits that. John Hollinger, the creator of PER, sets the league average to 15.0 every season. This year, some of the shooting guards closest to 15.0 include Ben Gordon, Ray Allen, and Andre Iguodala, if that gives you any frame of reference.

The present and future of this franchise belong to LaMarcus Aldridge, Damian Lillard, and to some extent, Nicolas Batum. Those three also happen to score 57% of the Blazers’ points. Matthews doesn’t really need to score in bunches, and he won’t get a lot of assists either since his touches aren’t designed for passing. Matthews, perhaps more so than any other starter, needs to be an efficient offensive player. That means limiting his turnovers, nabbing a few offensive rebounds here and there, and shooting high percentages.

Shooting

It’s a good thing, then, that Matthews has the best True Shooting Percentage (TS%) among Blazers’ back court players, and the 8^th best TS% among shooting guards in the league. Matthews will probably never score 20 per game, but as long as he continues to shoot 40% from three, and nearly 1.15 points per possession, he’ll be a productive complement to the Blazers’ other starters.

Rebounding and Turnovers

I’m obviously not too concerned with his lack of volume scoring or his 14.5 PER, but one thing that he could do better as a role player revolves around rebounding. I’m mostly concerned with the fact that Matthews ranks 50^th among the 66 qualified shooting guards in offensive rebounding percentage. Matthews doesn’t use a lot of team possessions for himself, so he should have extra time to crash the boards. But instead, he can be found ranked behind the likes of Kobe Bryant, Gordon Hayward and Jimmer Fredette when it comes to the offensive glass.

You might conjecture that these guys just get their own misses often enough to pretend to be good offensive rebounders. However, according to 82games.com, just 16% of Morman Jim’s scoring opportunities have come from “inside,” 22% for Bryant, and 25% for Hayward, as compared to Matthews’ 23%.  All these guys hang out away from the basket, too, but they get more of those OREBs! Plus, Matthews is hardly undersized at 6’5, 220 pounds, so I have to conclude that he just needs to get his ass in there and earn one more offensive rebound per game. One more offensive rebound could be worth a point per game. Another point per game on average translates into an expected three-win upgrade for the Blazers. I wouldn’t mind three more wins. It’s the little things! Okay maybe that’s a slight exaggeration, but he could still get in there more often.

As for ball security, Matthews actually limits turnovers pretty well. He ranks 19^th in possessions used per game among shooting guards, but has only the 25^th most turnovers per game. More time with the ball in his hands + less turnovers = good thing. Matthews’ turnover numbers are definitely not hurting the Blazers.

In total, our #2 is a quality role player. His 15 points per game make him a high-scoring role player, but still a role player. His offensive skills are fairly one-dimensional, and while he’s a good outside shooter, he’s not the best in the league.* He doesn’t give away possessions turning the ball over, but he doesn’t earn them back getting offensive rebounds either. Matthews will never be a star, but many teams need a Wesley Matthews around. The Blazers have one. Check.

*It turns out that Martell Webster guy we traded away for Luke Babbitt is currently 4th in the NBA in three-point percentage. Awesome. 

J.J Hickson: Apologies for the Conspicuous Lack of Stripper References in Article

Last post, I pondered why LaMarcus Aldridge has been shooting from farther away this season. After posting, I noticed something interesting about J.J. Hickson’s stats. Check out his scoring efficiency by true shooting percentage and points per field goal attempt over the past three seasons.

Year	TS%	Pts/FGA
2010-11	50.3%	0.92
2011-12	50.1%	0.93
2012-13	61.1%	1.16
Career	54.5%	1.02

Defensive Positioning

Hickson was awful during the 2010-11 season, and he was awful again during the 2011-12 season. Power forwards need to score well above 1.00 points per shot, and I don’t need to explain to you that 0.92 < 1.00 < Good. During that 2011-12 season, he only played 19 games with Portland, and much of that time was spent filling in for the injured Aldridge. Needless to say, Hickson didn’t get to play with Aldridge a lot before this season.

When this season rolled around, Hickson became a model of efficiency. He is currently ranked right behind the ever-efficient Steve Nash and well ahead of guys like Blake Griffin and Dwight Howard when it comes to true shooting percentage. Hickson has played a vast majority of his minutes with the L-Train this season, and you might recall that Aldridge is staying outside more this season than during the past few seasons. Hmmmm…things are starting to come together…but one last thing to check: Hickson’s shot distribution.

Year	Inside	Pts/FGA
2010-11	45%	1.19
2011 (SAC)	33%	0.98
2012 (POR)	46%	1.27
2012-13	58%	1.20

In those first 19 games with the Blazers, Hickson didn’t look all that different from his previous season in Cleveland. But with an entire off-season to work with Portland, and Aldridge specifically, Hickson’s offensive approach has changed. Though his efficiency inside has stayed pretty constant, he has definitely started going down low with more frequency.  It is perhaps no coincidence that Aldridge moved outside more this year, taking a noticeable hit to his own scoring effectiveness. The Blazers might actually be reaping the rewards of Aldridge’s flexibility in the form of Hickson’s migration down low.

None of this information alters my opinion that Center is the number one starting position the Blazers should be looking to upgrade. In fact, if Aldridge truly is making Hickson look better, then that should encourage replacing Hickson even more. His contract is up at the end of the year, so why not go shopping for a big man that can play a little defense? I mean, if Aldridge’s flexibility can help improve almost any big man’s scoring, then we can reap those same rewards with someone known more for his defensive ability.

Though Basketball-Reference deems Hickson to be the top defender (Drtg) on the Blazers this season, that’s more a commentary as to how bad the Blazer’s defense is. Across the league, Dtrg rates Hickson similarly to Markieff Morris, Troy Murphy and Luis Scola—not exactly defensive stalwarts. And there’s even some controversy as to Hickson being that “good” at all. 82games.com rates his defense as the worst of the Blazer’s starters. Now that just leaves us confused.

Defense is inherently hard to measure. Simply using blocks and steals hides far too much information, so I’m forced to do something laced with bias: use my eyes. In multiple games that I’ve watched at the Rose Garden this season, I’ve taken bits of time to specifically watch Hickson on defense. I would describe his awareness and positioning off the ball as mostly nonexistent. His athleticism seems to occasionally make up for it, but I watched the likes of Marcin Gortat take any position he wanted inside for an entire quarter, and I can’t get that image out of my head.

I would consider myself in the camp that wanted to trade Hickson while his value was high. But the deadline passed, and the Blazers lost an opportunity to find some new talent for an expiring contract. I get the feeling that not all of Hickson’s improvement is his own doing, and that Aldridge makes him look a little better than he is, so I’m down to get another Marcus Camby-like defensive juggernaught and let Aldridge do his thing, circa 2010.

Aldridge the All-star?

The L-Train is averaging a modest 20.8 points, grabbing 8.6 boards, and dishing out a career-best 2.6 assists per game. He became just the 8^th Trail Blazer to ever be selected to consecutive All-star games, and his Smile Above Replacement rating is off the charts. So what is there to gripe out? Efficiency.

Season	2009-10	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
TS%	53.5%	54.9%	56.0%	52.2%
Usage	18.0	21.8	21.4	21.8

Aldridge has been “using” a steady diet of 21-to-22 possessions per game for himself since the 2010-11 season, but his true shooting percentage is telling us that his points per possession ratio is A) not all that good for a big man, and B) at a career-worst this season.  For comparison, here is what the other power forward-type starters have done this year.

Player	TS%
Serge Ibaka	0.606
Chris Bosh	0.595
Blake Griffin	0.578
Kenneth Faried	0.574
Al Horford	0.570
Ryan Anderson	0.570
David Lee	0.556
Paul Millsap	0.553
Marcin Gortat	0.542
David West	0.540
Kevin Garnett	0.534
Joakim Noah	0.524
LaMarcus Aldridge	0.522
Al Jefferson	0.521
Zach Randolph	0.507
Josh Smith	0.492

Being more efficient than Zach Randolph and Josh Smith is not something to write home about. Perhaps the top comparable on that list is Chris Bosh, who also plays away from the basket a fair amount, but even his 59.5 TS% is miles better than that of the L-train. In fact, Bosh’s career 57.1% is better than Aldridge has ever achieved in even one season.

That Aldridge is not an efficient scorer shouldn’t exactly shock you. Aldridge takes a lot of long two-pointers for a big man. On cue, 82games.com is there to tell us that 74% of his scoring attempts have come from jumpers. 74%!?! Not surprisingly, Aldridge scores about 0.85 points per shot from out there, and a much better 1.25 points per shot from inside. His outside shooting is obviously not helping the team directly, so we can only hope he’s creating space inside for the other guys.

However, it’s hard to evaluate Aldridge’s effect on others, and whether or not he’s creating that space. We have to be careful looking at team statistics when Aldridge is on and off the court. For instance, the team shoots better and gets more assists when he is on the floor—but of course, the team shoots better and gets more assists when each of the starters is on the floor. That’s what happens when your starters play together for long stretches of time, and your bench sucks. It’s hard to apportion credit to any one player.

With the information that we do have, we know that Aldridge has not been an efficient scorer this season—not what we expect from an All-star, anyway. But good news comes in the form of an increased assist-to-turnover ratio, ranking him among the league’s best big men. Not that his A/TO ratio makes up for his poor scoring efficiency, but it’s something positive amidst a down year for the big man.

Aldridge is definitely a good player. It takes a special talent to be able to score 20 points night in and night out. But unless the spacing he provides allows the rest of the Blazers to attain significantly increased efficiency, then he is not quite the All-star he is made out to be.

Followup: In the near future I hope to look at some players that have played significant minutes with and without the L-Train in the hopes of finding that they shot more efficiently when playing alongside him.